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How  the  common  market  organizations  operate 
The  various  dates  on  which  the  Conmunity's market regulations 
have  come  into  force  are  well  known.  Since  1  July 1967  numerous 
products  and  groups  of products  have  been  s.ubject  to. single-
market  systems,  with  common  market  organiz~tions and  common  price 
levels, 
This  would  seem  to be  a  good  time  to  examine  the  procedure 
by  which  decisions  are  reached,  to see  who  takes  the  decisions 
affecting the  common  market  organizations,  to study  - specifically 
how  Community  decisions  are  arrived at in practice, 
I.  How  responsibilities are  shared out 
A.  Between  the  Hember  States and  the Community 
Regulations  for  the  single-market stage  evolve  slowly  over 
a  period of  time,  as is explained below. 
(a)  Transition period 
For  the  first market  organizations an important step had  to 
be  taken:  import  arranger.1ents  had  to be  brought into line and 
all obstacles  to  trade  h~d to be  removed  and  a  single instrucent -
a  levy  calculated and,  so  to  speak,  fixed  on  a  Community  basis  -
substituted for  them. 
In  some  important areas,  however,  tho  l1ember  States  and  the 
Comnunity  share  joint responsibility;  here  there  ha.s  been  no 
alignment,  merely  co-ordination.  This applies in particular to 
prices,  support measures  and  export arrangements. 
Prices.  The  Community  fixes  a  price range  (or bracket);  the 
Member  States  fix  prices within  this bracket,  conforming  to the 
principle  of  price regionalization where  this has  been  provided 
for.  The  r:1enber  countries  are still free  to limit the  guarantee 
to  a  specified quantity in some  of  the  market  organizations 
(e.g.  cereals). 
Intervention.  For  cereals,  an  intervention price is fixed,  but 
further  intervention oeasures are also possible. 
It has  turned out in practice that intervention measures 
have  been applied in accordance  with  the  standards generally 
followed in the past.  In  the cereals·sector,  for  example, 
certain Hember  States have  resorted  to support  buying,  while  in 
other member  countries  with  surplus production  the  use  of this - 2  -
form  of  intervention hns  not been  necessary,  recourse  to  buying 
having  been  obviated by  the  use  of  traditional market  support 
measures  involving stockpiling. 
The  pi~,eat regulation  provided  for  the  possibility of 
intervention,  but  did not  m~ke it obligatory, 
Export  arrangements.  Provision is made  for  export  refunds.  The 
Connunity  establishes  a  general  frar.~ework and  defines  the  maximum 
amount  of  refund.  The  Member  States  decide  whether  a  refund is 
to be  granted  or not,  and  should  they  decide  to grant  one,  it is 
they  who  fix its nr.tount. 
Each  Member  State  therefore retains  the  refund as  an  element 
of market  policy,  and  also, if necessary,  as  an  element  of 
commercial  policy. 
(b)  The  single-market stage 
Tbe  single-market regulations  provide  for  hnri:~oniza  tion  on 
these  three  essential points  - prices,  support measures  and  export 
arrangements  - because  the  nio is to create  a  large market  with 
the  characteristics of  a  national  one. 
From  now  on  price policy is formulated  entirely by  the 
Conflunity,  which  fixes  basic  prices  - and regional prices  too 
where  these  exist  (derived intervention prices).  For  products 
subject  to  a  system  of  derived prices,  the calculation of these 
is  o.n  essential factor  for  the  free  nover.tent  of goods. 
Intervention policy is also controlled by  the  Conuunity.  The 
following,  for  instance,  were  fixed  on  a  Comnunity  basis: 
(a)  Intervention centres  for  cereals; 
(b)  The  tine at which  intervention should  take  place,  either by 
11autonatic"  purchasing at  n  predeterr:tined price  (cercnls)  or 
by  buying approved by  the  Corulunity  once  nnrkct  prices within 
the  ZEC  fnll  below  the  basic  price  (pigneat); 
(c)  The  price at which buying-in  takes  place  ~nd the  conditions 
of resale  for  products  bought  by  the  intervention agencies. 
At  the  single-mnrket stage  the  Cottnunity itself decides  what 
refunds  should  be  granted. 
That  both intervention mensures  and  refunds  are  decided at 
Community  level is a  direct  consequence  of  the  establishment  of 
a  single  market,  with all  the  characteristics  of  a  domestic  market, 
in which  goods.can circulate freely.  Indeed,  experience has - 3  -
shown  th::~.t  even  the  difference's rcnaining when  the  refund  - a 
Community  one  - has  been  paid oay  be  enough  on  their own  to 
c~use deflections  of  trade. 
B.  Between  th~ various  organs  of  the  Connuriity 
It is clear  then  thnt some  important  types  of  decision  have 
been  transferred  from  the  Member  States to  the  Community  in the 
narket  organizations. 
Now  who  takes  wh.l.t  decisions within the  Community'? 
(o.)  The  Council 
The  Council has  reserved  to itself the  right  t·o  make ·a 
certain number  of decisions in implementation  of the  common 
market  organizations: 
(i)  Basic  decisions  of a  political  nat~re,  where  the 
Europe~ Parliament is consulted as  required by  the 
Treaty.  Examples  of  this  type  of  decision are: 
(a)  the  annual  fixing  of prices; 
(b)  the definition  of regularization measures  for  eggs 
and poultryJ  or 
(ii)  Decisions  of a  gencrnl nature affecting  the  implementation 
of the  conmon  organizations.  Exnmples  of  this type  of 
decision are: 
(a)  basic principles with_regard  to intervention; 
(b)  gcneral.rules governing intervention; 
(c)  the  principles governing  the  calculation of levies 
on  derived products. 
(b)  The  C01nnission 
The  Connisaion ha.s  been  en trusted with naldng implementing 
decisions proper: 
(i)  Inplcoenting procedures  which  ~erve as  a  pattern  for 
others  and must  be  adopted  oncu  ~n-principle;  examples 
of  these  are  the  criteria for  the  buying-in of cereals. 
by  the  intervention agencies,  conditions  for  denaturing 
co.rmon  wheat,  condi  tiona  for granting import  or  export 
licences; 
(ii)  Periodic~l manugenent  decisions,  such  as  the  fixing  of 
levies,  refunds  and  the  amount  of aid  for  oilsceds. - 4 
The  majority of  these  decisions  nre  taken in accordance 
with  whnt is known  ns  tho  Hanagenent  Committee  procedure 
(see  below). 
However,  sane  of  then are  a  ~attcr for  the  Commi~sion 
alone),  nar.1ely: 
(a)  periodical  decisions of  a  quasi-autonatic nnture,  and 
(b)  urgent  decisions,  such  as  changing  the  amount  of  the 
export  refund in the interval between  two Hanagement 
Conmittee meetings,  or decisions involving the  safeguard 
clnuse. 
II. How  Community  decisions are  reached 
A.  The  Conrnission 
Some  readers will  assume  froo  what  has  been  s~d nlready 
th:1t  all decisions  are  taken in Brussels,  th:1.t  the Member  States 
can  no  longer nalw  their  own  decisions,  and  these  reu.ders  will 
argue  that Brussels  has  no  direct  knowledge  of the  problems. 
The  situation is quite  different in reality.  A prelininary 
remark must  be  made  at this point:  the  Connission's ndninistrativc 
departments  do  not  duplicate  those  of  the }lembcr  Governncnts.  The 
Connission in fact  carries  out its adninistrative  tasks in close 
co-operGtion with  the Member  States,  working  through  ~nd with 
their governnent  dopartnents.  Contrary  to  what  people  sometines 
think,  then,  there is no  11super-adr:linistration11  in Brussels, 
Qerely  a  su~ll staff barely able  to  cope  with  preparing  the 
Connission  decisions  which  ensure  Cor.munity  n.::m~gencn  t  of  the 
market  organizations. 
A few  figures will prove  this.  The  cereals  division,  for 
example,  h::ts  a  staff of  27,  ten  of  these  being higher-grade,  "A" 
officials;  the  milk products  division hus  a  staff of  20,  ten 
being  11A 11  officials.  There is no  conparison  between  these  st::tffs 
and  the  nuQber  of  officials engaged in oarket adoinistration in 
the  Meober  States. 
With  such  a  small stuff,  the Coouission  would  find it very 
difficult to nakc all the  nanagonent  decisions  required  of it were 
it not  for  close  co-operation with  govorru:tent  departnents  in  the 
Menber  States and consultation with  representatives  of  agri-
cultural and allied associations. - 5  -
(a)  Co-oper2tion  with  the  Me~ber States 
Management  of  the  regulated narketa is  11relayed11  through 
the  Monber  Stntes not  only  for  final implenentation but  also 
fron  the start - when  the  econonic  data needed  to  follow  the 
devolopment  of  agricultural narkets are being prepared. 
(i)  The  elaboration  nnd  prep~rntion of  the  necessary  economic 
dat~ is bused in purticulnr  on  inforontion  trnnsnitted by 
the  Member  States. 
The  Comrussion makes  every  effort  to  obtain  the  cooparablc 
figures  which  nre  needed,  for  instance,  to  get the milk 
products  regulations  under  way  or to inplenent  the pignent 
regulation. 
A whole  series  of  regulations uakc  provision for  the 
trnnsnission  of inforrultion  by  the  Meuber States  to  the 
Co:uaission.  In  th•~  cnse  of cereals,  for  instance,  IJore  than 
25  different  types  of infornntion are  supplied every  day  or 
every  week  depending  on  the  circumstances.  Infornation is 
supplied daily  on  the state of  the  world  n.:1rkct  with  a  view 
to  the  fixing  of levies,  and  on  the quantities for  which 
inport  and  export certificates have  been  issued,  this 
infornntion being essential if any  adjustnent  of refunds  proves 
necessary.  Inforn~1.tion is supplied weelcly  for  the  cnlculn  tion 
of  refunds,  as  are  details  of quantities bought in by  the 
intervention agencies. 
The  need  for  ouch  infornation has  obviously  grown  with 
the  advent  of  the  single narket,  and  a  const~nt flow  of 
infortJ.ation has  now  developed between  the  Conoission  and  the 
I1enbcr  States. 
The  nunbcr  of ncssnges  received by  telex in  the 
Directorate-Genernl for Agriculture has  increased fran  230  a 
oonth in 1962  to  1  400  a  month  sirice  1  July 1967.  The 
nunber  leaving the  Directorate-General has  increased froo  250 
a  Donth  in 1962  to  the  prc~ent level of 2  700  a  month. 
However,  infornntion is not  relayed  by  telex only.  It 
il3  nlso  p:l.Ssed  on  at neetings  of experts  examining  the  narket 
situation and,  for instance,  at the  weekly neetings  of the 
Cerca.ls Hanngetlent  Gonni ttec,  which  examines  the narket, 
taldng into account  the  refunds  to be  fixed. 
The  Connission  suppler.1en ts this infornation  where 
necessary in various  wnys  - through  contucts  with 
representatives  of agricultural  orgo.nizations  (see below), 
inforr:1ation  on  prices abroad,  and  so  on. - .6  -
(ii)  The  Comnission  organizes  frequent  n~etings with  experts 
from  th8  Menber  St~tes to study  the  problems  presented and 
to  work  out  wh~t oeasures  are  needed.  If their presence is 
felt  to be  necessary,  representntives of agricultural 
organizations  whom  the  nationul delegates  see  fit to invite 
ony  attend  these neetings. 
(iii)  But  the Mnnagenent  Coru~ittees are  the  principal vehicles 
of  co-opor;1.tion  with  the  Neuber St;ttes.  The  first  of  these 
cane  into being with  the  bnsic  regulations  of 1962,  a 
conmi  t tee  being  sot  up  for  c:cch 'product  subject  to I!lQ..rket 
regulation. 
Each  Managenent  Comnittee  conprises representatives  of 
the  Menber States  who  neet under  the  chairnanship of  a 
Comr.~ission representative.  In  the  Carmi ttce  the votes  of  the 
Member  States are  weighted  as  provided  for  in Article  148(2) 
of  the  Treaty,  which  ncans  that Gernany,  France  nnd  It~ly 
h~vo  four  votes  each,  Belgiun  and  the  Nethcrl~nds two  each, 
and  Luxembourg  one.  The  chairncm  does  not  vote. 
The  Hanagement  Corami ttees give  .:m  opinion  on  proposed 
measures  subnitted  to  then by  the  Cormission,  twelve  votes  boin~ 
the najority required. 
Proposals are  either endorsed by  a  twelve-vote majority 
or rejected by  3  twelve-vote nnjority,  or  no  fornal  opinion 
is issued if twelve  votes  cannot  be  found  either  for  or 
a~Y,ainst. 
In  the  case  of  a  fnvournble  op~n~on,  or  where  no  opinion 
is giv(;n,  the  text is referred back  to  the  Connission,  which 
then  decides  on  tho  measures  to be  taken. 
Where  a  Managenent  Coonittoe  votes  against  a  proposal, 
the  C  omHission nay  ir1plemcn  t  the  rJ.ensure  inncdia  tely,  or it 
nay  postpone  i~plenentntion for  a  nnxinurn  period of  one  nonth. 
In  both  cases,  however,  the  Coonission is  oblig~:d to refer 
the  text  to  tha Council,  which  h::ts  up  to  one  nonth in which 
to reverse  the  Cohlr.lission's  decision. 
This  co-oper~tion between  the  CoMnission  and  the 
Hnnngenent  Conni ttees is cxtrcnely effective,  ancl it nay  be 
said  that  the  experincnt  has  been  a  conplete  success. 
The  national  delegations are nllde up  of representatives 
of  the  variol.lS oinistrics and  departnents  concerned, 
particularly those nost  directly associated with market 
nanngtment  (Ministries  of Agriculture  and Finance,  the 
Einfuhr- ~  Verrntsstelle in Gernany,  the  Produktschnp in 
the  Netherlands,  and  ONIC  and  FO:R!IA  in France). - ?  -
The  nunber  of  M~nagenent Connittee ncetings is growing 
steadily.  Tho  Cereals: Conni  t·tee,  for  inst.:1nce,  which  used  to 
neot  once  a  nonth,  h~s been neeting every  weok  since  the 
sinzlc-nnrket stage  was  reached. 
Now  for  sane  figures  on  the  work  done: 
Between  thei~ inception and  30 Septenber  1967,  612  texts 
wertJ  referred  to  the  Carmi tteee. No  opinion  was  given  on  77 
texts,  or  1~~ of all those  submitted,  and  in  four  cases  an 
unf;1vourablc  opinion  w~s given,  which  neant  th~t these  four 
texts  h~d to  be  referred to  the Council.  In all other  cases 
the  proposals  were  endorsed,  which  gives  some  idea  of the 
degree  of co-operation  which  h.:1s  been  est.:J.blished  with  the 
Henbt.:r  States. 
~he Conmittee nnchinery  enables  the  Connission  to 
ascertain unci  underst<1nd  the  situation within  the  Cor1;;_1unity 
better,  anci  gives  the !1enber States nn  opportunity  of 
participating in  the  prepn.rr.tion  of Connission  decisions  which 
they  thenselves  will have  to inplcnent at  a  later stage. 
Finally,  the  systen is an  effective vehicle  for 
co-operation  between  t1enber  States,  since  the  delegates get 
usecl  to  discussin~ the  r:wnngerwn t  of  a  narket  together  and  to 
taking account  c;f  the  problens  this  pos~::s  for  cnch  country. 
(b)  Consultation  with  trade  associutions etc. 
The  Treaty nukes  ~rovisiun for  consultation with  the 
Econonic  and  Soci.J.l  Con•ti ttce  1  who  nust  be  asked  for  their 
opinion  by  the Council  or  the  Connission  wherever  specified. 
The  Econouic  and Social Connittee is conposed  of representatives 
of  tho  v<"Lrious  econot:tic  and  social groups. 
Its nenbers  ar~  appoint~d by  the  Council  following  the 
subnission  by  each  Hcnbcr State  of. a  list containing  twice 
0.s  nany  candicintcs  ns  there  nrc  seats allotted to each  country. 
Geru:1ny 1  France  and  Italy. c:1c,h  have  24  representatives  on  the 
C  ouui ttee,  Belgiwt  and  the  Neth<crlands  12  each,  and  Luxembourg 
11.=-.s  5. 
The  Econonic  and Social Cormittee is consulted  on  all 
basic  agricultural regulations.  In  the  case  of narkct 
r1amc~er:wnt,  however,  this  consultat:j..on  takes  place within  the 
advisory  connittees  set  up  by  the  Connission.  These  hnve 
between  20  and  36  nenbers  representing associations  organized 
at  Cmutunity  level  (in  other  words,  specialized  ~uropean 
organiz~tions), notably  producers  and  consuners,  industry and 
comwrce  1  trade  unions  unci  co-opcrn ti  ves.  The  ComMission 
consults  these  conuittces n.:1inly  on  the  operation  of  the 
rnchinery  for  inplenenting the  regulations. - 8- .:. 
This  co-operation between. the  Cor..:Dission  c.nd  European 
trade  associations  nnd  the  like has  two  advnnt.:-tges:  it keeps 
the  Connission inforued of  the  day-to-day  working  of  tho 
com1on  agricultural policy  and its practical consequences  for 
agricultural_and allied circles;  and it affords  the 
associ:.1tions  in the  nenber  countries  an  opportunity  for 
integration at European level,  since it encourages  theQ  to 
do  everything possible  to work  out  coLman  points  of  view. 
The  Connission is anxious  to nake  these  carmi ttees as 
effective as  possible  and is trying in particular to cut  down 
on  the  tine needed  to  obtain  the  opinion  of  the  appropriate 
associations. 
The  co-ordinating associations  (Dachverbande)  are 
received periodically by  Vice-Presiflen  t  Ibnsho~  particularly 
the  Cow1ittee  of Agricultural Organizations in the  EEC  (COPA), 
the  General Connittoe  for  Agricultural  Co-oper~tion in  the 
EEC  countries  (COGECA),  the  Union  of Industries  of  the 
European Coununity  (UNICB),  the Connittcc  of Conoercial 
Organizations in the  countries  of  the  EEC  (COCC~E),  trade 
unions  and  consurwrs'  organiz.:.:tions. 
(c)  Decision  procedure  within  the  Conr:1ission 
Another  iuportnnt factor,  this tine  an  internal  one,  is 
the  consultation which  takes  pLtce  between  the  Cor.1r:1ission 
C.epartoents  on  proposed oon.sures.  For exanple,  the 
Directorate-General  for External Relations is consulted  on  all 
n::>.. tters affecting  rel.J. tirms  with  non-nenber  countries,  while 
the  Dir-ectorate-Generc.l  for  the  Internal Harket is  consulted 
on  questions affecting custons. 
Ln.stly,  we  should  see  how  thu  Connission 1  o.  corporate 
body,  takes  decisions  on  proposc.1.ls  prepared by  the  technical 
departnents  (Directorates-General),  which  in  th0  case  of 
agriculture act in nccordc.ncc  with  the instructions  of 
Vice-President Hansholt,  President  of  the Agricultural Group, 
and  are  subject  to his authority. 
Important  questions  arc  discussed  by  the Coonission  as 
a  body;  even w1tters  of  clay-to-day adninistration can  be 
discussed in this  way  if they  are  likely to have  political 
repercussions. 
All  other questions  are  subnitted to  the  Conr.1ission  by 
r:1eans  of  the  written procedure.  Any  nenber  of  the  Cor.lL!issicn 
con  interrupt this  procedure  nnJ  ask that the nutter be 
exanined by  the  Cor.mission  as  a  body if he  so  desires. - 9  -
Everything  h~s been  done  to  ensure. that  decisions are 
tetk.en  with  the  necessary  rn.pfd:!-ty,  and  a  special prucedure 
has  been  introduced  for  cases involving  tho  safeguard clause: 
an  extraordinary noeting  of  the  Connissibn nay  now  be  called 
to  ueal  with  these. 
B.  The  Council 
The  Council is seldon called upon  to  take  decisions  other 
than  on  ·'l  proposal  subni tted by  the  Coooi.ssion.  Strictly,  the 
Council is  e~1powered to  take  decisions  under Article  28  of  the 
Tre::1. ty  without  a  Cor.mission  proposal,  though in practice  the 
Crna~ission does  usually put  forward  proposuls  as  to  the neasures 
to  be  taken. 
As  a  general  rule,  however,  the  Council  can  adopt  decisions 
only  on  a  Coanission  proposnl.  The  text  of  the  rogulntion, 
directive  or  decision  thCLt  is to be  put  to  the  Council is drafted 
by  the  Connission's  Directorntee  ... Qeneral..  Apart  fron  the 
Hcm:J.geo~n  t  Coar1i ttee  procedure  and  the  procedure  whereby  authority 
to  sign  decisions is delegated,  all that has  b~en said so far 
about  the Connission's  decision  procedure  npplies  to  these 
propos:c1.ls:  .their  drafting and  adoption by  written procedure  or, 
where  necessary,  following  discussion within  the  Connission 
ex~ctly  follows  the  pattern already  described. 
On  its  su~1ission to  the  Council,  the  proposal is either 
referred to  the  Econonic  cmd  Social Comoittec  or  to  the  European 
Parli.:.-...nent,  or it is ir:l!'ledintcly  discussed within  the  Council  -
cevendin6  on  its legal  b~sis.  Discussion within  the  Council is 
:o.lways  pr.:ceded  by  n  preliuinnry  exanin~tion which is ns 
thorough  ~s possible. 
This  prelininnry  exanin~tion is carried  o~t by  specialized 
bodies  on  agricultural questions set up  by  the  Council.  There  is 
a  Speci:1.l  Carmi ttce  for  Agriculture  and  there  are  also working 
p~rties.  The  latter are  conposed  of  experts  fron  the  Menber 
St:ttus  an•J  arc  convened  by  the Special Conuittee  fo:r;  Agriculture 
or  by  tho  Council itself for  prelininnry discussion  of  the 
probleus  r~isdd by  a  Corrrtission  proposal;  they arc  to arrive 
at  the  1 ~re ttest possible neasure  of agreenent. ,  As  at Council 
m0etings,  tho  CoLrrtission is represented at neetings  of  the 
Specinl Carmi ttee  for  Agricul  turc  ~.md  the  working  parties  by  the 
o.ppropritte  officinls. 
The  findings  of  a  working  party are  used  as  a  basis  for 
discussiun  by  the  Special Cormittoe.  It uay  happen  that  the 
que.stinns left  open  by  the  working party are  solved within  the 
Speci:.tl  Conni ttee.  If not,  the  Coru:1i ttee refers  these  back  to 
the  working  party,  or  they  ure  discussed within  the Council if 
they  arc  inportaht  1  politic:.ll natters  on  which  agrcenent  cannot 
b8  reached.  The  Council nay  return  the file  to  the  Special 10 
Courli ttec  with  ins.truct:i.ons  to  open  fresh  (~iscussions en  ccrt'lin 
aspects,  nnd  the Connittee  nr~.y  refer the  nn.tter  to  the  working 
pnrty  ngnin. 
Once  agrceuent  has been  reached within  the  Specio.l Connittee 
for Agriculture,  the  proposal is trnnsnitted ns  "Point A11  to the 
Council,  hnving  been  put  into  fino.l  forn  by  a  te.::t.."l  of lawyers, 
linguists and  occo.si0nnlly  experts,  fr0n  the  ~ie~ber States  o.nd 
the  Conni.ssiott.  If a  propos:1.l  appears  on  the  o.gendo.  as 
"Point A",  this  nornally  r:1.eans  that it is not  discussed  ;_-_ny 
further  by  the Council;  if one  of  the  Menber  St.:ttes  wishes  to 
re-open  discussions,  the .iten is placed  on  the  agendn  for  the 
next  Council neeting.  This  "Point A"  procedure is designed  to 
lighten  the  burden  of work  f.:tlling  on  the  Council  while  uo.intain-
ing  the  basic  principle thnt it nlone  is conpetent  to take 
decisions. 
While  a  Cor.1!'1ission  propos.'l.l is being discussed by  the  Council, 
the  Menbcr  St.::ttes  on.y  have  sane  observntions  to nake.  In  cases 
of this kind,  provided the  Council  has  not acted,  the Connission 
n.'ly  N'.lend  its origin:1.l  proposnl,  particulnrly where  the r:.wtter 
h.'1.S  been  referred to  the  Europe~ Parlinnent.  If the Connission 
sticks to its originnl  proposal,  the  Council is enpowered  to 
anend it only by  ncans  of  n  unaninous  vote  (Article  149  of the 
Tre.::tty).  Decisions  h.::tve  in  fact  ne.:1rly  alwnys  been  voted 
unnnioously  despite  the  fact  thnt,  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty,  a  sinple najority vote  hns  sufficed since  1  Janun.ry  1966. 
Besides  this  decision procedure,  the  Council rny also  h;.1ve 
recourse  tCJ  a  written  procedure  which  nakes  possible  the 
adoption  of  urgent  decisions  where  a  Council  neetine;  cannot  be 
arranged  within  the  specified tiue.  This  procedure,  which  is 
rarely used,  h~.d  a  certain currency  during  the  "crisis" nonths 
of 1966. 
The  general publio is n.nazed  at the  a.gricul  tural  "n:-trn thons  11 
held by  the Council  and at  the  length  of  tir:w  needed  to  re~ch a 
deciaio:Q.  This  ann.zenent is hardly  justified.  It night  even  be 
argued that reforns  as  fnr-renching  us  those  introduced by  the 
Council's agricultural regulnti0ns  took less tine  than is 
generally  tho  c~s~ in  the  Henbcr  States  when  inportant  ch:--.ne;cs 
are  being  n.'1.dc  in national  regulC~.tions. 
This  systen of  "ru.rathon"  sessions  proved  worth  while in 
hannering  out  the  basic  regulations,  but it is unlikely  to  be 
used  e1.gn.in  once  the  cannon  organizations  .:1.ro  under  wny.  Thero 
is,  however,  nn  expln.n.cttion  for  these  narnthons:  not all the 
Govcrnnents  hnve  the  sane  econonic  interest in  the  sane  product, 
and in r:lGny  c-ases  agreEment  could  only  be  ren.chud  by  obtaining 
conparablc  guG.ranteos  for  the  vnrious  groups  of producers. - 11  -
It is true  thnt this  syst-An  h.-"LB  ..c:trr"bli.n-disn.dvant.ngas 
because it adds  unnocessnrily  to  the  nunber  of  ~o.ttcrs  on  which 
the Moi..1bcr  States  cuntinu.::  to be  in dis:1greenent  up  to  the last 
uinute.  NDvertheless,  in the  context  of  the  present structure, 
it ensures  a  balanced-devolopocnt  and nnkes  econooic  decisions 
politically possible. 
It was  this  concern  for  a  balanced  developnent  that ooved 
the Connission  to  propose  to  the Council  an  annual  dab.a.t.;;  .on 
agricultural prices in general. 
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Page  3  (under principnl exporting countries)  Chinn:  for  100_000 
tons  rend  10  000  tons. 